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Abstract: Recent years have witnessed an eruption of what have been termed culture wars, often
converging around the messier aspects of interpersonal relationships and corresponding identity
issues that are complex, sensitive, and contested. These are emotive topics that are often colonised
by activist groups, and consequently have become enveloped in particular regimes of truth and
assertive identity politics. They are often also, by their nature, the kind of issues that are central
to social work practice. This can lead to pressure on social workers and social work students to
think that these orthodoxies ought to underpin and define the profession, which in turn can lead
to the silencing of alternative opinions and the closing down of dissent. This article seeks to locate
identity politics in a political and cultural context. It goes on to set out classic arguments for free
speech, viewpoint diversity, and for the need for social work to embrace and engage with such. It
explores the notion that the closing down of debate about contentious issues, the disincentives that
exist to expressing controversial opinions, and the uncritical adoption of ideological orthodoxies
work against the development of the critical thinking skills that are essential for social work practice.
Keywords: critical thinking; identity politics; academic freedom; free speech; victimhood;
anti-discriminatory practice
1. Introduction
We write this article as social work academics concerned about threats to free speech in the social
work academy and in increasingly managerial and regulated practice contexts. The particular prompt
for writing stems from the experience of one of the authors (Mark) who, at different points, has been
subject to negative professional and press attention for questioning dominant narratives of historical
abuse in residential child care. The views that elicit such negative coverage are based on extensive
personal and academic experience and are published, largely, in peer-reviewed journals [1–4]. Indeed,
questioning the construction of historical abuse narratives resonates with emerging international
research [5–7]. It assumes a particular currency and necessity in the UK in the wake of the conviction
in 2019 of Carl Beech [8] for perverting the course of justice in respect of false allegations made against
a series of public figures. The Beech case destabilises current public and criminal justice policy around
the default position of ‘believing’ those claiming to be victims of abuse, and highlights the need to
be able to question such dictums, regardless of the contemporary cultural potency they have come
to assume.
The reaction to Mark’s published views provides a particular illumination of the cultures of
the social work and child-care establishments when confronted with any view that might question
orthodoxies around child abuse. It is an experience shared by others who have sought to ask such
questions. Sikes [9], for instance, found herself in what she calls the eye of a storm of criticism
and hostile publicity for seeking to problematise schoolteacher/pupil relationships, while Sikes and
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Piper [10] discuss the difficulties they encountered from a university ethics committee in seeking 
approval for research into false allegations made against teachers. One reviewer admitted that he 
could not countenance approving a proposal that did not take for granted the truth of any allegation of 
abuse made by a child. The Beech case, inter alia, highlights the reality of false allegations and the 
consequences of these for those who are subject to them. These are issues that, in the interests of 
natural and social justice, academics—and indeed, social workers—ought to be concerned about.
Concerns about the implications of questioning the basis of abuse claims are set against a 
backcloth of wider disquiet experienced by the authors as to how to prepare students to negotiate 
contested identity issues in an increasingly regulated and foreclosing professional context. While the 
social work academy has previously engaged with questions of identity and identity politics [11,12], 
these sorties have been overtaken by recent cultural shifts, which highlight the threat posed to free 
speech and to viewpoint diversity by revivalist outbreaks of identity politics [13]. In this article, we 
seek to re-engage social work with debates around identity in the light of these cultural shifts. Our 
argument is that to practise ethically and effectively requires that social workers need to be aware of 
and to engage with identity politics and not fall back on default positions that they may feel 
pressured or socialised to adopt in respect of what is the right thing to say or do in particular 
circumstances. Rather, they ought to approach complex social issues with a critical spirit, recognising 
that there are rarely easy answers and around which a variety of positions might be taken.
The article covers a lot of ground and, as a result, does so with a broad brush, identifying rather 
than always elaborating many of the ideas presented. Some of the connections made are at this point 
speculative and themselves open to question; the intention is to outline current cultural trends and 
to suggest their relevance to social work. The article begins by locating identity politics in the civil 
rights struggles of the 1960s and how these have since morphed from concerns around structural 
disadvantage affecting major societal groupings to the expression of a myriad of personal and minority 
group identity claims. We suggest that identity politics are compatible with a neoliberal worldview 
and its focus on individualism rather than on society. They also create victims among those who feel 
their particular identity positions are not respected, and this culture of victimhood has deleterious 
implications for erstwhile assumptions of the importance of free speech. We go on to re-state classical 
assertions of the need and justification for free speech and academic freedom. We argue that free speech 
is a prerequisite for critical thinking, a skill that is consistently called for in social work education, but 
which is often lacking in academic engagement and in professional practice. We conclude by asserting 
the need for social work academics to engage with and to engage their students in a range of heterodox 
ideas where contentious and difficult issues can be freely debated.
2. Background
Fukuyama [14] suggests that the subject of modern identity politics was born from the 1960s
struggles of marginalised groups for equality and dignity, and the idea that, even when laws were
changed, “the psychological burdens of discrimination, prejudice, disrespect or simple invisibility
remained ingrained in social consciousness”. Echoing Furedi’s [15] critique of therapy culture,
Fukuyama identifies the merging of those ideas with institutions that had absorbed the central idea
that raising self-esteem was intrinsic to well-being, culminating in a fight for the recognition of inner
worth based on group identity. A key development in the identity politics movement is described
as follows:
Each marginalized group . . . could demand that society treat its members identically to the
way that the dominant groups in society were treated, or it could assert a separate identity
for its members and demand respect for them as different from the mainstream society. Over
time the latter strategy tended to win out. [15]
This led to the notion that each group’s ‘difference’ meant that outsiders could not appreciate nor
understand their unique experiential history and ‘lived experience’.
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The manifestations of this focus on identity are increasingly apparent in febrile conflicts between
the (new) left and the (alt) right, and are amplified by social media. These are played out on a number
of different fronts: in universities (particularly but not exclusively American at this point), we witness
shout-outs, no-platforming, and claims around abusive sexual cultures and oppressive institutional
responses to these [16,17]. The ‘left’ version of such expression has elicited a popular reaction against
what is seen as their excessive political correctness, much of which has been channelled through
academic commentators such as Jordan Peterson. Peterson speaks out against what he identifies as
increasingly foreclosing and stultifying academic and cultural climates, which circumscribe what is
and isn’t allowed to be said. The polarising nature of such clashes can be discerned politically in
developments such as the election of Donald Trump in the US and, in the UK, the Brexit vote, both of
which can be framed as a reaction to the power of what is identified as a free-floating liberal elite.
The anger of the populist right, which these developments may act as a proxy for, is more likely the
result of free-market economics that have increased competition, leading to economic inequality and
relative poverty [18], and have stripped communities of well paid, secure jobs and replaced them with
low status, precarious, and poorly paid zero-hour contract work. The stressful effects of loss of status
and increasing inequality have, of course, been well documented [19,20]. The situation is exacerbated
when people must compete for scarce resources and therefore blame those they are competing against,
which is often, in the current climate, immigrants. To voice their concerns means that they are
immediately, in the orthodoxy of identity politics, called ‘racist’ and further disenfranchised from
legitimate political debate. This cultural and existential angst in which erstwhile centres of authority
or legitimacy no longer hold means that the ensuing social conflict is visceral, with little room for
compromise or common ground.
The culture wars are also fought out on an epistemological front. Traditional conceptions of
knowledge are increasingly deconstructed and argued to derive from and to reflect the interests of
privileged social groupings, generally those of white males and correspondingly, to fail to accommodate
other knowledges and particularly those that derive from ‘lived experience’. This latter knowledge
source is particularly relevant to professions such as social work, where there is a recognition of
multiple sources of knowledge, including that which comes from experience and a desire to include
lived and co-constructed knowledge within its canon. Of course, knowledge is rarely neutral, and to
imagine it to be so can mask power imbalances in its construction and utilisation. Post-structuralist
and feminist perspectives, rightly, draw attention to knowledge’s relationship with dominant power
structures and the need to deconstruct these to recognise the condition and advance the rights of
traditionally oppressed groups. On the other hand, the movement to question traditional power and
knowledge structures has in many instances allowed this process to degenerate into mere solipsism,
which denies any valid ground for understanding beyond that of personal experience and diminishes
the need for facts or for questioning or critique.
Identifying the destructive nature of the tendency to portray what might previously had been
identified as legitimate debate, in the terminology of war, Bruno Latour, doyen of Science and
Technology Studies, bewails the current rush to deconstruction and iconoclasm, asking “What has
become of the critical spirit? Has it run out of steam?” [21]. It is such a critical spirit that we argue
ought to be fundamental to social work, but which is under threat from a focus on identity politics
but also from managerial and regulatory structures and cultures that seek to circumscribe what social
workers might say (and perhaps even think). Our concern, as social work academics, is that the
profession is largely unaware of and insufficiently engaged with the ramifications of these major
cultural disruptions. Yet, the nature of social work places it at the centre of some of the issues these
movements converge around.
Foremost among these issues are the views expressed by groups that reflect particular waves or
interpretations of feminist thinking—currently what might be identified as fourth-wave feminism.
This seeks to identify interlocking and intersectional aspects of female domination within patriarchal
systems. Social work has historically and rightly been influenced by feminist thinking. Thus, in
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thinking they are being feminist, social work students and social workers can be pushed to adopt
fourth-wave positions on domestic abuse, for instance, and to unquestioningly accept notions of
patriarchy or coercive control [22] and wholly unconvincing notions that this latter construct can only
operate in the direction of male oppression of women. Without going into the detail in this article,
such assertions are empirically, conceptually, and ethically problematic. Moreover, by promoting
recourse to punishing offenders (or perpetrators as the language goes), such doctrines contribute to
punitive and carceral responses to social problems [23]. In fact, understanding domestic violence as
simply a manifestation of the patriarchy is as reductionist and one-dimensional as blaming Muslim
neighbours for the lack of good jobs in a decaying community [24]. Yet, current positions become
reduced to a standpoint assertion—“It’s feminist because I say so!”—which diminishes the depth and
sophistication of feminist thinking and what it can offer to social analysis and what it has offered to
social work [25]. Our position is that both the identity politics of the left, some of which might be
thought to resonate with social work values, and the right, which are at odds with them, stifle good
thinking and understanding.
3. Neoliberalism and Identity Politics
The kind of identity politics outlined above sit comfortably within a neoliberal worldview, the
expression of which might be traced back the elections of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald
Reagan in the US. The political movements these elections represented fractured the post-war consensus
of embedded liberalism or social democracy characterised by a system of governmental restraint and
regulation, which kept corporate and business excesses in check and allowed for areas of life to be
considered beyond the reach of the market (health and social care, for example) [26]. This political
norm was supplanted by neoliberalism, which embraces free market economics, removes regulation
and restraint, and opens up civic life to the creation of markets [18]. Economically, it re-distributes
wealth in favour of the rich, increasing economic inequality and poverty [27].
This political shift to the right failed to provoke a broad-based economic or class-based analysis or
response from the political left, even whilst “the major factors influencing the human condition . . .
across the world remain grounded in poverty and breaches of human rights” [28]. The response that
did emerge was a version of identity politics which, in many respects, reframed understandings of
social justice away from structural and collective concerns towards a focus on validating the identities
of minorities. The resultant identity politics, as Lilla [13] says “became the de facto creed of two
generations of liberal politicians, professors, schoolteachers, journalists, movement activists” [13], as
well as officials of the Democratic Party in the US and the Labour Party in the UK. Social justice became
reduced to “a pseudo-politics of self-regard and increasingly narrow and exclusionary self-definition
that is now cultivated in our colleges and universities” [13]. While clothed in progressive credentials, a
predominant focus on identity is not, in fact, radical or liberatory, but may also reflect the narcissism [29]
and individualism [13] of neoliberal worldviews.
Michaels [30] suggests that while the response to problems caused by economic inequality requires
that we do something about it, the solution to differences based on diversity is to celebrate those
differences. A politics of the self fails to look for connections between people in embracing the common
aim of a better society, and provides “an intellectual patina to radical individualism” [13]. The current
fixation with identity has come to exhaust political discourse, marginalising issues of class, the economy,
and the common good. Without an economic lens, the fight for social justice is anchored in issues
of racial, gender, and sexual diversity, allowing the capitalist project to march on uncontested [31].
It has produced a generation of those who may claim liberal and progressive credentials that are
“narcissistically unaware of conditions outside their self-defined groups” [32], resulting in a politics
that demands rights shorn of any corresponding obligations placed upon its citizens.
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4. Identity Politics and a Victimhood Narrative
In contemporary culture, rather than engage with competing or unpopular ideas through a civil
and progressive exchange, as envisaged in classical Enlightenment thought [33–35], ideas themselves
have become suspect, recast as microaggressions if they are deemed to question or offend a particularly
held fast belief. By this way of thinking, speech alone becomes a form of violence or hatred, and has to
be closed down. Schulman [36] observes a shift in how the word “abuse” is deployed to shut down
dissent and evade the work of negotiation and repair in the course of everyday human conflicts.
This state of affairs results in what Campbell and Manning [17] identify as a victimhood culture.
This has academic implications; for some, the mission of universities has been redefined, moving away
from critiquing and advancing knowledge towards promoting the claims of particular identity groups.
In this context, opinions that might be at odds with a person’s own account of themselves are amplified
to ‘hate’ (phobia) of the group the person belongs to, and concomitant calls for protection from said
‘hate’ and the harm that might be said to result.
Arguably, such protectiveness helps nobody, least of all those who would wish to be protected
from views they do not like. It does not prepare students for the real-life situations they will have to
face as they enter the working world. It certainly does not prepare them for social work, where personal
slights and value clashes are everyday occurrences. Moreover, it is not good for students’ mental health,
encouraging them to operate in states of anxiety verging on depression [37,38]. So, while protecting
them from words and ideas that may or may not cause some kind of emotional discomfort is only a
momentary solution, in the long run, it actually harms the students and, ultimately, the profession
they enter into. This susceptibility to ‘harm’ is psychologically compatible with thinking in terms of
victim identity. Žižek [39], in one of his many critiques of identity politics, notes that for one’s voice to
gain authority in contemporary culture, one has to legitimize oneself as being some kind of victim
of power. However, defining problems in terms of victimhood or vulnerability can act to repackage
structural issues as individual ones in need of therapeutic rather than political interventions [40]. For
example, Kipnis [16] objects to what has become the dominant feminist position regarding women’s
vulnerability, especially when applied to female students on university campuses. She challenges
the view of women as passive, without desire or agency and objects, to the view of men as sexual
predators and in need of control or education. This identity politics type of feminism, again, allows
structural and economic barriers to women’s agency to go unrecognised, obscured behind agendas of
vulnerability and protection.
As well as masking structural inequalities, the claim to speak from a particular identity position,
often forwarded by self-appointed protectors of the non-powerful in academia and in civil society,
is calculated to assert the moral superiority of that identity and to inhibit questions. Debate is now
reduced to whoever has “invoked the morally superior identity and expressed the most outrage at
being questioned” [13].
5. The Case for Free Speech and Threats to It
The current difficulties in the academy in raising certain issues leads us to a reassertion of the
need for free speech. The kind of critical thinking required to negotiate complex social (work) issues
demands it—it requires permission to step outwith the consensus, to take risks, and to move beyond
established frames of reference [41]. While arguments for free speech can be traced back to the Ancient
Greeks, the classical liberal position on it derives from the work of J.S. Mill [42], who presumed against
the state’s right to prescribe what people are allowed to say or hear; there ought to exist, he stated, “the
fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however
immoral it may be considered”. The only limitation Mill conceded to free speech was to prevent harm
to others. His conception of harm was of a risk to bodily security or public order. In fact, his defence of
free speech presupposed that some views might be considered unpalatable—offence was not a defence
against the right to free speech.
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Mill saw critical thinking as a bulwark against state tyranny. He considered lack of critical
thought, or “holding fast to something”—a “common-sense” belief in an ideology or “truth” in terms
of conformity. He railed against the mediocre conformism, increasingly evident in civic society that
is capable of “enslaving the soul itself” [43]. Moreover, according to Mill, those who seek to silence
dissenters do themselves an injustice. They should welcome debate; if they are confident in their
arguments, they ought to allow their possible refutation as this process of contradicting and disproving
one’s opinion “is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action” [42].
Arendt [44] reinforced this argument in her censure of those beset by the “mere habit of holding
fast to something. Much more reliable”, she argued, “will be the doubters and skeptics, not because
skepticism is good or doubting wholesome, but because they are used to examine things and to make
up their own minds” [44].
It can be difficult to stand against conformism in contemporary culture, amplified as it is through
social media; once a critical mass of people uncritically follow perceived wisdom or “common sense”
around any particular issue, then questioning that narrative becomes risky in respect to adverse
publicity and reputational damage. For example, Dreger [45] outlines her experiences as a researcher
and activist of becoming embroiled in the sexual politics of transgender individuals and groups. She
used that experience as a springboard to seek out other academics who had researched topics related
to human identity and who had been vilified for their findings, discovering “a whole fraternity of
beleaguered and bandaged academics who had produced scholarship offensive to one identity group
or another and who had consequently been the subject of various forms of shout-down” [45] (p. 108).
Other recent examples include Hill [46], who explored the controversial subject of greater male than
female variability in IQ, inevitably meaning that there are more men represented in the very high
echelons of IQ tests, but also more in the very low categories (there is no difference in mean IQ).
Although the same trend can be seen in other studies (for example, Deary et al. [47] found the same in
their analysis of over 80,000 Scottish children who took an IQ test, aged 11, in 1932), Hill’s analysis was
so unpalatable that academic scandal and controversy ensued culminating in the rejection of the paper,
after acceptance, and the actual removal of the paper from another online journal after being published.
A more recent example is Lisa Littman’s study, which found social media and peer pressure contribute
significantly to gender dysphoria among young girls. Once again, the article was removed from the
university web site due to a backlash from the trans community [48].
A further example of negative reactions to non-conforming ideas is evident in the phenomenon of
‘no-platforming’. This has spread to the UK from the USA, a prominent example being when feminist
writer Germaine Greer was ‘no-platformed’ at Cardiff University for her views on transsexual women.
The expressed justification was that Greer’s views constituted hate speech [49], when in actuality,
Greer was simply questioning the basis for self-identity. Can calling yourself a woman be sufficient
to actually be a woman even in the face of biological evidence to the contrary? If the answer to that
is ‘yes’, then the consequences for scientific discourse and epistemologies of facts and knowledge
are profound.
The closing down of non-conformist speech and exploration of those consequences, on the basis
of protection from ‘hate’, has led to a culture of what Lukianoff and Haidt [37] identify as “vindictive
protectiveness”, with deleterious implications for free inquiry. In fact, inquiry itself becomes redundant,
because activists “believe they possess the full truth already” [17]. In short, the above are consequences
of the epistemological wars pointed to earlier. Where research findings are in contradiction to a group
or a group representative’s “lived experience” and beliefs, reactions can be powerful. Such is the
adoption of the orthodoxies by the institutions of contemporary society, that dissenting research voices
can be silenced and potentially new and illuminating information removed from public access or
indeed scrutiny.
24
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6. Critical Thinking in the University: Academic Freedom
The rights to freedom of thought and speech espoused by Mill and the dangers of conformity
highlighted by Arendt provide a compelling justification for the doctrine of academic freedom. This
was recognised in law in the UK in the 1988 Education Reform Act. More recent legislation in Scotland,
the Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016 (26 (4), confers “freedom within the law to: hold
and express opinions, question and test established ideas or received wisdom, develop and advance
new ideas or innovative proposals, and present controversial or unpopular points of view”. However,
the scope for universities to adhere to such principles can be compromised by political and civic
cultures that would seek to limit it. In Mark’s case, a tweet in response to his university’s statement of
support for academic freedom suggested that this was all very well but . . . this seems to be the position
of swathes of civil society to viewpoints that challenge received positions on matters of identity.
Yet, there are good reasons why universities might seek to safeguard and not to qualify academic
freedom. Williams asserts that free speech is at the heart of the idea of a university, being integral to
its “collective enterprise to critique and advance knowledge” [50]. It renders knowledge provisional
and contingent and subject to change in light of shifting circumstances, thus offering the prospect of
paradigm shifts, when the weight of evidence for new ways of thinking begins to tip the balance away
from erstwhile, outdated and unhelpful forms of knowledge [51].
While there should be few restrictions to the kind of ideas one might hold and argue, in reality,
and in practice, we would recognise some bounds. Indeed, Mill [42], himself, while recognising the
primacy of free speech, is predisposed against gratuitous offence. As social work academics, we would
wish views to be expressed responsibly and sensitively and to contribute towards some social good.
The essence of free speech is that we open up our views to others in what Habermas [35] identifies as
the public sphere, which accommodates a multiplicity of viewpoints. Houston [52] introduces a further
dimension to applying Habermas’ discourse ethics by suggesting that these can be complemented
by an orientation that draws on Honneth’s [53] concept of recognition. Indeed, Honneth’s concept of
recognition is a quality that would seem to be consistent with most social workers’ values. However,
these considerations are not an obstacle to or an argument against free speech, but rather offer pointers
as to how we might exercise that right ethically, and so that it might have positive effect.
So, what constitutes knowledge and what is or isn’t allowed to be said should not merely reflect
the ‘held-fast’ views of activist or establishment groups. When arguments are well grounded and
soundly constructed, and where they highlight and might offer possible alternative solutions to wicked
social problems, we have a duty as academics to surface them. Failing to do so teaches students
to stick to the “language rules” [44] whilst not critically thinking about the complexity of human
experience. Merely sticking to the “language rules” in social work practice may be understandable in
an increasingly regulated professional landscape, but it does not make for good social work.
7. Identity Politics and Social Work
There are particular features of social work that make its alignment with the worst excesses of
identity politics possible. For example, the anti-discriminatory practice (ADP) movement, which
emerged in the early 1990s, in practical expression, focussed primarily on discrimination at personal
and declaratory rather than structural levels [12]. This resonated with identity politics thinking
from a relatively early stage in the development of social work knowledge. Through such a lens,
social injustice was perceived as a problem of “cultural injustice” rather than of economic inequality.
Therefore, it followed that cultural recognition should be the remedy [12]. This meant that social work
was well positioned to absorb the increasing domination of identity politics, their political orthodoxies,
and their emphasis on “lived experience”. Garrett [54] points out that “keywords, such as ‘difference’,
‘diversity’, and ‘multiculturalism’ are malleable and can be put to work for forces which represent—in
the broadest terms—the political left or right”. Nevertheless, this focus on diversity became entrenched
in social work under the mantra of “valuing difference” [55].
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The identity of the abused care leaver is one that social work has valorised. It is rooted in personal
experience or the interpretation thereof, but is also one that has been co-opted because of its political
currency by particular individuals and advocacy groups. Thus, it has assumed a cultural potency in
recent years. Nevertheless, its emotional appeal should not exempt it from academic critique. An aspect
of Mark’s own experience involved tweets from care leaver advocates stating that the only response
to narratives of abuse was “I believe you”. This is problematic, ethically and intellectually, as the
Beech trial highlights, but also because while narrative approaches to research hold an understandable
appeal in social work, they should not be employed at the expense of proper analysis or different
interpretation [56,57].
Furthermore, social work is increasingly concerned with protection agendas, which were already
explored in terms of women earlier [16], and the management and fear of risk [58]. The shift from
helping families in difficulty to protecting children from risk, with parents often redefined as risk
factors, has been well documented [59,60], and has led to the casting of children and young people as
always in need of protection and/or of being subject to long-lasting harm. Questioning that orthodoxy
has become almost impossible in the current climate.
The implications of this state of affairs for social work are addressed by Webb [11]. Picking
up on the Axel Honneth/Nancy Fraser debate around the respective social and structural claims for
recognition and redistribution, Webb identifies with Fraser’s [61] argument that claims for cultural
recognition are “serving less to supplement, complicate, and enrich redistributive struggles than to
marginalize, eclipse and displace them” [61]. Webb’s own position is clear: he argues that the “ethical
predilection based on recognition of the Other in terms of diversity and ‘the right to difference’ should
be simply abandoned” [62] (p. 309). We would not go so far as Webb in dismissing ideas of recognition,
and certainly not the version articulated by Honneth, but do agree on the need for this to be located
within a redistributive political frame. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that social work has lost further
ground in achieving the balance between recognition and redistribution. Fenton [63], for example,
found that the newest generation of social work students appear to have internalised a neoliberal ethos
of individualism—recognising individual ‘rights’ to identity while expressing punitive attitudes to the
poor, unemployed and ‘undeserving’.
McLaughlin suggests that these attitudinal tendencies can lead to:
Social workers demonstrating their ‘anti-oppressive’ credentials by admonishing the asylum
seeker for using sexist language, while at the same time refusing them services, or taking
their children from them, because they are not considered ‘one of us’. [64] (p. 56)
Another consequence of adopting an identity-based political viewpoint alongside a punitive
attitude to poor or unemployed people is that social work risks dismissing and cutting itself off
from the people it works with and their worldviews and concerns that may not reflect the ‘taken
for granted’ identity views of a social (work) elite (see, for example, Hochschild’s [65] evocative
ethnography of a Trump supporting community in Louisianna). A further example is given in
Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell’s [24] exploration of the rise of English nationalism in northern England.
The over-riding feelings of the interviewees, who were members of the English Defence League,
were anti-immigration and anti-Muslim, alongside a profound hatred of the liberal left who were
viewed as having abandoned traditional working class communities that had been devastated by
de-industrialisation and austerity, and focussing instead on giving support to, and promoting the
rights of, different identity groups. Simply reacting with disapproval to the racist language/attitudes of
the people in those communities, while having no critical understanding of the economic forces that
have brought about grim circumstances for them means that understanding and relationship-building,
which are core to social work, will be extremely difficult.
So, a preoccupation with identity politics among social work students means that in order to
‘be’ anti-discriminatory, the ideological positions adopted by activist groups are often accepted as
the ‘correct’ position to take, as ADP is put to work for certain ideological positions as well as for
26
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neoliberalism. Students who differ from that ideological positioning can find themselves keeping quiet
in class and not taking part in debate [66]. This is unsurprising, given the consequences for students
who might disagree with the orthodoxy. For example, Felix Ngole was removed from his social work
programme (in a finding later overturned) for expressing reservations about same-sex marriage on
Facebook [67,68]. His view was in keeping with his values as a Christian, and he insisted he would not
treat people any differently, and yet articulating his belief was enough to remove his right to practice.
8. Critical Thinking in Social Work
Paradoxically, while prevailing managerial climates and adherence to particular identity-based
‘truths’ inhibit critical thinking, the skill is currently recognised in educational and professional
discourse as being an essential one. Various regulatory and qualifications frameworks determine that
practitioners ought to be able “to gather, analyse, critically evaluate and use information”, and “to use
research, reasoning and problem solving skills to determine appropriate actions” [69] and to “critically
identify, define, conceptualise, and analyse complex/professional level problems and issues” [70]. The
framework for honours degree courses states that social workers should be able to “critically evaluate
arguments, assumptions, abstract concepts and data (that may be incomplete), to make judgements,
and to frame appropriate questions to achieve a solution” [71].
In setting out these requirements, these bodies are merely reflecting what the literature on learning
and teaching in higher education says about the nature of “graduateness” [72]. Graduates ought to
understand and balance how ideas relate to one another. By Masters level, they should operate at a
level of extended abstract thinking where they can theorise, hypothesise, reflect, and generally play
with ideas [73]. Such qualities are claimed to prepare graduates as agents of social good in an unknown
future [74].
The core disposition to be acquired through higher education and one which, according to
Barnett [75], is fundamental to moral commitment and social engagement, is a capacity to cope with
epistemological uncertainty and complexity, which, together, he suggests, result in an existential
experience of ‘strangeness’. Increasingly, the literature on professional formation identifies the
importance of the Aristotelean intellectual virtue of practical reasoning, which involves critical thinking
but also the development of a certain kind of person, one “disposed towards questioning and criticizing
for the sake of more informed and responsible engagement” [76] (xvi). Qualities of critical reasoning
are especially important in social work where workers are daily confronted with issues where there are
no formulaic or easy answers [77]. Properly, then, most social work programmes list ‘critical thinking’
as an explicit learning outcome.
However, Sheppard et al.’s [78] study of 12 social work programmes in England and Wales
suggests that they do not achieve this. Whilst finding that social work graduands scored more
highly than a UK population normative sample on interpersonal characteristics such as insight and
altruism, the researchers also found that they scored significantly lower than the normative sample on
assertiveness and on critical thinking, with approximately one-third of the sample scoring very poorly
on critical thinking tests. These findings add weight to a previous study [79], which demonstrated that
although interpersonal skills were predictive of success or failure on social work programmes, critical
thinking skills were not.
At one level, Sheppard et al.’s findings may reflect an historical resistance in UK social work to
theory and good thinking [25,80]. At a more personal level, social workers are exhorted, and are likely
to be predisposed to be empathetic. Yet, Bloom [81] argues that empathy is a poor moral guide, and
that decisions guided by it may have deleterious consequences. He proposes instead what he calls
rational compassion, which requires critical thinking. This historical resistance towards ideas and
dispositional orientation among social workers towards empathetic engagement is compounded in
more recent years by what Houston identifies as the “iron cage of regulation” within which “ethics
have been conflated with rules, procedures, codes of practice and standards” [52] (p. 1288). Whittaker
and Reimer [82] provide some evidence for this from their research, which found that, when reflecting
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on an ethical dilemma, social work students were motivated, primarily, to comply with rules and
procedures. Fazzi [83] also found that social work students in Italy were less imaginative and creative
in their responses to social work problems after their programme of study then before it. They had, in
effect, learned codified and standard responses.
Whilst this paper does not suggest that this situation is solely a result of ideological orthodoxies and
social work’s adherence to them, it does make the point that such adherence contributes significantly
to the lack of thinking and debate necessary to develop critical thinking skills. When these results are
taken together with findings from Twenge [84] and al-Gharbi [85], who found that young people and
students were more censorious of free speech than previous generations and felt that people had to be
“protected from offence at all costs” [83] (p. 258), then a picture begins to emerge where students may
find it easy to stick to approved tropes or language rules, which mean they do not have to think too
deeply or critically about issues and where they can rest assured that they are not causing offence. In
the light of Sheppard et al.’s findings about lack of assertiveness, the attraction of those tropes is even
more apparent.
In summary, contemporary society confronts us with disincentives to good thinking, including
increasing regulation, standardisation, and the pressure not to offend imposed by the rise of particular
identity group orthodoxies, which foreground the interests of particular groupings and contribute
to a closing down of debate on key areas of relevance to social work. These disincentives may be
felt particularly acutely in the field of social work due to increasing regulation and traits in the new
generation of social workers, including weak critical thinking skills, weak assertiveness skills, and a
desire to protect people from offence as paramount [63].
9. Conclusions
It is our position that the social work profession and academy, in order to (co)-produce critical
thinkers among its graduates and practitioners, cannot fail to engage with contentious issues—these
are the profession’s bread and butter. Contention, in the contemporary world, increasingly converges
around issues of identity and victimhood. In social work, such issues often come to the fore around
matters of sexuality and domestic and sexual violence, present and past, all framed within a protective
metanarrative. However emotive such subjects are, a variety of lenses needs to be brought to bear
on them, not to minimise or excuse wrongdoing, but to illuminate their inevitable ambiguity and
complexity. It is only in so doing that we have any chance of maintaining an ethical stance and
improving practice.
Currently, single, orthodox ‘truths’ that are driven by activist groups and compatible with
neoliberal individualism dominate and subsume that ambiguity and complexity. These orthodoxies
and the serious consequences of deviating from them, social work’s framing of anti-discriminatory
practice, censorship, and self-censorship combine to create a mix wherein critical thinking can be
discouraged, and students learn the ‘correct’ things to believe and the ‘correct’ language rules.
Although it is acknowledged that social work practitioners in the current regulatory climate, must,
for reasons of self-preservation rather than ethics, take care to abide by behavioural codes, whilst they
are students, they should be encouraged to honestly share and explore opinions. It is only in this way
that opinions can be challenged, discussed, critically considered and, perhaps, sometimes changed,
and that the resultant critical spirit might filter through into practice. This is especially pertinent
at a time when social work education is attracting students from increasingly diverse backgrounds
with a corresponding diversity of views, as exemplified in the Ngole case (see [66]). The profession
cannot respond to complex social and cultural issues merely by reciting politically correct orthodoxies,
claiming that these reflect the kind of reductionist values embodied in professional body’s codes or
repeating the mantras of activist groups on questions of identity; instead, it needs to engage with the
ontological, intellectual, and ethical issues raised by heterodox viewpoints.
All of this has implications for the kind of learning and teaching strategies that might be employed
in preparing social workers to be critical thinkers and to be comfortable in the ‘strangeness’ that might
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be their experience in encountering a range of views different from their own. Lea and Stierer [86]
argue for the need to teach the conflicts in any particular discipline. In social work, this would involve
questioning current doxa around, for instance, domestic violence and historical abuse, to help students
realise that there are legitimate counter-arguments to dominant ones.
Kreber [70] identifies the need for pedagogies that provoke students to critically reflect on their
assumptions, beliefs, and values so that they might move beyond frames of reference that limit how
they make meaning of their experiences. Moreover, teaching ought to require and encourage students
to take risks, take a stance, and ‘go public’ with their knowledge claims, subjecting these, willingly, to
the critical scrutiny of others [70]. For students to dare do so, academics, in turn, need to be supported
to model such risk-taking through going public on matters of concern, which can be viewed as heretical
in ideological orthodox cultures that seek to close down legitimate debate.
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